

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.

SECRET

COUNTRY	USSR (Far East)/Korea/China	REPORT NO.	<input type="text"/>	25X1
SUBJECT	Soviet Intervention in the Korean War	DATE DISTR.	8 April 1954	
25X1		NO. OF PAGES	2	
DATE OF INFO.	<input type="text"/>	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD	
PLACE ACQUIRED	<input type="text"/>	REFERENCES		

25X1

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

25X1

SOURCE:

25X11.

As early as 1949, he expected something interesting to happen in that part of the world /presumably Korea/. described the military preparations taking place at that time in North Korea, and the organization and training of the North Korean Army, especially commending the North Koreans for their effectiveness with artillery.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X12.

before the Korean War a great deal of materiel (medicines and materiel directly connected with war preparations) was sent to North Korea and that he had personally read some of the documents concerning specific items of supply which had been requested by the North Korean Government. This official stated that he saw these documents in approximately 1949 - probably a year to a year and a half before the outbreak of the Korean War. He stated further that it was obvious to him at that time that there was a concentrated build-up in progress in North Korea.

25X13.

all plans for the Korean War were worked out by a special group in the General Staff of the USSR and that the leadership of the forward element of the Soviet General Staff was located in China, with liaison officers in civilian clothes assigned to North Korea. All such advisors were required to operate very carefully to avoid unfavorable publicity and knowledge of their presence there and their activities for fear of political repercussions. Members of the Soviet Air Force fought in Korea for training purposes in

SECRET

STATE	Y	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AEC		<input type="text"/>	X
-------	---	---	------	---	------	---	-----	---	-----	--	-----	--	----------------------	---

25X1

[Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#"]

25X1A

SECRET

-2-

anticipation of a possible future war with the US and as a means of providing assistance to the North Korean Air Force and Chinese Air Force, principally the latter, since the former is comparatively insignificant. They were under strict orders not to go too far from the Yalu River for fear of capture.

25X1 4.

25X1

[redacted] before the Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War there were differences of opinion concerning this matter between the USSR and the Chinese Communist Government. The USSR insisted that the Chinese had to send troops to North Korea to save the situation because the North Korean Army was in a helpless condition at that time. Mao Tse-tung was afraid to do this because of major problems and troubles in his own country and his inability to supply his own troops. Mao was particularly concerned about political reactions and ramifications, both internally and especially externally, should Chinese troops enter the Korean War. In principle, however, there was an agreement between the two governments to help to save North Korea, and the Chinese viewpoint was that North Korea was very important to China strategically. Negotiations between Mao and the Soviet Ambassador to China were held at this time. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] No results were reached during these negotiations, [redacted]. [redacted] Stalin insisted that China immediately send troops to North Korea to save the situation, and Stalin promised to equip completely the Chinese Army with ammunition, arms, and other necessary items. Stalin also promised additional economic assistance to China. After these promises were received from Stalin personally, Mao sent Chinese troops to North Korea. This information was classified as very top secret and sensitive information [redacted]

25X1

5. The USSR did not expect that the US would enter the Korean War and thought that it would be concluded successfully in a few months. The USSR policy as regards the Korean War has been privately criticized by some Soviet officials as actually forcing the US to change its policy, to become firm, and to give more attention to rearmament. There were quite a number of persons who had a great deal of trouble for having done poorly and failed in the Korean War. Pak Hon-Yong, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea until summer 1953, was put on trial along with other North Korean leaders, but source does not recall whether or not he was sentenced. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Many persons were punished for miscalculations and poor planning in connection with the Korean War, primarily individuals from the General Staff in Moscow.

SECRET

25X1